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scope of this paper is limited even with reference to its title.
In the first place, the writer assumes that the regularization policies
here in question are those intended to deal with general business
cycle disturbances and not those arising from seasonal influences or
from special sources of irregularity affecting particular industries
or trades. Private stockpiling to reduce the size of seasonal peaks
and troughs in production or other activity is widely practiced. In
some industries, which produce staples relatively free from cyclical
influences, it has been carried very far. And schemes to encourage
stockpiling by customers, as well as producers, have been worked
out and applied. Extending such practices to offset business cycle
disturbances, however, meets very serious difficulties, some of which
we notice below. As a result, the emphasis in matters of policy
necessarily shifts from private to public action, although some scope
for private action remains.
A second limitation is that the available public policies them-
selves raise far-reaching issues of feasibility and effectiveness. Price
policies, monetary policies, and tax proposals open up areas for
discussion that have been covered extensively in other connections.
In the present paper, it is manifestly impossible to do more than
point to the existence of problems. Their exploration, even in con-
nection with inventories, must be left for other occasions.
Finally, the reader is asked to remember that the purpose of the
meeting for which this paper was prepared was to exchange ideas
and reports of experience and to advance proposals for discussion
and further study. None of the policies described below is free of
serious difficulties; all have implIcations that require more investiga-
tion. At the present time they merit serious consideration, but not
adoption.
Background
A large part of the cyclical changes in total output normally takes
the form of changes in the rate of inventory accumulation. In short
phases, such as the cycles of the mid-twenties or the contraction of
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1937-1988, a major part of the total change in output was due to
inventory movements. But even in major movements like those of
1929-1932 and 1932-1937, inventory change was important. We may
take it, therefore, that stabilization of inventory movements is of
enough importance to justify the use of drastic measures if they
promise to be effective.
Inventory movements occur for two principal reasons. The first is
that the quantity of stocks business requires to produce and dis-
tribute goods rises and falls with the volume of business activity.
Any expansion or contraction of business is, therefore, aggravated
by the inventory accumulation or liquidation that inevitably ac-
companies it. Following a convenient and familiar terminology we
may say that such changes are in response to changes in the "trans-
actions motive."
The second reason is a speculative one: firms sometimes build
inventories to make capital gains or to protect their position against
the effects of rising or falling prices or against shortages of goods
when the economy is operating under great strain. For most types
of goods, though not for all, such speculative movements are prob-
ably not an important regular feature of ordinary business cycles.
But some goods are normally affected by speculative influences,
some business cycles are marked by periods of speculation affecting
goods generally, and some general speculative episodes occur in-
dependently of the regular processes of business cycles, usually as
a result of some major political development. Inventory movements
in this category I shall call movements in response to "speculative
motives."
The impact of inventory movements on the economy is propor-
tionate to the vigor of the movements and to the volume of stocks
subject to fluctuation. A 5 per cent increase in inventories during a
given period will affect the economy less than a 10 per cent increase.
But a 10 per cent increase affecting $50 billion worth of inventories
will disturb the economy less than a 10 per cent increase affecting
$70 billion worth of stocks. U.S. business carries a very large volume
of stocks, and the fluctuation in these stocks amounts to substantial
percentages. Thus inventory changes in this mass of goods mean
substantial increases or declines in orders and in general production.
This points to three general ways in which inventory policy can
assist the general stability of economy. First, we may seek to
eliminate or weaken the factors that influence transactions or spec-
ulative motives. Second, we may seek to reduce the sensitivity .of
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stocks to changes in the strength of these motives. And third, we
may seek to reduce the volume of stocks subject to disturbance.
In addition to such measures, which would attempt to reduce the
impact of inventory fluctuations by influencing the operations of
private business, there is a fourth possibility: the government or
some other public agency might seek to reduce instability in the
volume of stocks by itself accumulating or liquidating commodities
in such a way as to offset the movements of privately held in-
ventories.
Policies Affecting the Investment Motives
THE MOTIVE
Since most inventories are carried mainly to aid the production and
distribution of goods and are accumulated in rough proportion to
changes in output and sales, any action leading to greater stability
in economic activity will pay extra dividends by reducing inventory
fluctuations. From the point of view of public policy, what is at
issue is the general question of the control of business cycles and
that is manifestly beyond the scope of this paper. From the view-
point of private policy, the question is whether individual firms can
do anything to encourage customers to increase purchases in slack
times. Acting independently, they would have no incentive to
discourage sales in good times, but if they could induce their
customers to hold larger stocks when business is bad, this should
carry with it some retarding effect on sales later when business is
on the upgrade.
The inducements that private firms can offer are, of course, price
reductions or collateral concessions in the way of favorable credit
terms or delayed delivery and provision of storage. These are,
mainly, speculative inducements, so the policy merges with those
considered immediately below.
THE SPECULATIVE MOTIVE
Policy under this head comprises all those actions that may be effec-
tive in eliminating the kinds of price changes that lead to cocyclical
inventory speculation and in encouraging the kinds of price changes
that induce contracyclical speculation. Since price movements and
business cycle movements are generally in the same direction, what
is to be avoided is speculation in the same direction as price changes.
What is to be sought is speculation in a direction opposite to the
price changes.
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The kinds of general price changes that lead to general waves of
cocyclical speculation of the undesirable kind presumably are those
that are rapid, or of considerable duration, or based on solid or
spectacular causes justifying belief that they will continue in the
same direction.
Extremely rapid changes are undesirable because capital gains or
losses per time period are proportionate to the rapidity of price
change. Hence the volume of investment or disinvestment set off
is likely to vary with the speed of change.
Long-continued changes are to be avoided because they usually
persuade businessmen that there will be further movement in the
same direction.
Similarly, the appearance of other solid or spectacular reasons for
expecting price changes is to be avoided. Examples are sudden and
large changes in government expenditures, general changes in wage
rates by government fiat (as under the NRA) or by over-all union
action, and large changes in the gold or foreign exchange value of
the dollar.
Both the government and the national banking system ought to
use their influence to avoid price changes likely to precipitate
speculation.
1. The government can act positively by its control of Treasury
receipts and expenditures and negatively by its influence on the
labor market.
2. The government can also act through the various federal
lending agencies to alter the availability and the terms of credit
when price movements threaten to set off speculation.
3. The banking system, controlled and led by the Federal Reserve
System, ought to take parallel action through its own peculiar
instruments.
4. The effectiveness of these actions would be enhanced to the
extent that the government and the Federal Reserve System could
specify in advance the kinds of actions they would take and the
criteria by which the timing of such actions would be determined.
To that extent, motives for price speculation in either direction
would be weakened by anticipation and the occasions for actual
public countermoves would occur less frequently.'
Manifestly such proposals raise all the well-known problems of
the timing, coordination, and effectiveness of fiscal and monetary
1Thissuggestion was contributed by Dean de Chazeau.
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controls. There are many sound reasons for doubting whether
satisfactory results can be achieved by these methods in the near
future. The timing of public countermoves is especially troublesome
since it requires the authorities to forecast the trend of private
business at least some months inadvance,something for which
no reliable procedure has yet been devised. This tells particularly
against suggestion 4, above. In addition, one may doubt whether
interest rate changes and credit restrictions if confined within the
limits to which we have grown accustomed in the last two decades
can be effective in checking speculation. There is also the point that,
for most purposes, credit is required only to finance speculative
accumulation, not for speculative liquidation. It remains true, how-
ever, that credit controls are sufficiently powerful to check specula-
tive accumulation if the authorities will go far enough and if they
think such stabilization worth the possible derangement of their
other policy objectives. So far as fiscal policy is concerned, one need
only recall its notorious sluggishness, both in formulation and in
application, to appreciate the fact that it is of limited use for this
purpose.
Public policy in this area is presumably limited to negative objec-
tives, to checking undesirable kinds of price changes so far as
possible. Individual firms may be able to go somewhat further. Con-
ceivably, they may be able to induce contracyclical speculation.
They will have an incentive to do so in depression, not in prosperity,
so that the indicated sphere of private action is depression, while the
sphere of public action (insofar as it depends on credit control) is
prosperity.
If contracyclical speculation is to be induced, customers must be
convinced that prices are relatively low and that they are unlikely
to fall much more in the near future. This suggests that, if possible,
firms should cut prices severely when business falls off, but they
should also avoid a policy of continuous price reductions. If possible,
prices should be set to apply to all sales for a stated number of
months. And customers would be encouraged to take advantage of
such bargains if the selling firm offered to protect them against the
possibility of subsequent price reductions within some specified
time period.
It goes without saying that such policies could not be fully
implemented in industries with many small producers because it
would be impossible for sellers or buyers to have any assurance
about the future course of prices. Even where firms are few, overt
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agreement about the timing of price cuts would often be necessary,
which raises all the familiar problems of encouragement of monop-
oly. It then becomes questionable whether the potential benefits
outweigh the dangers of permitting such arrangements.
Policies Affecting the Sensitivity of Inventories to Changes
in the Transactions and Speculative Motives
REDTJCING SENSITIVITY TO TRANSACTIONS CHANGES
Given the ratio of inventories to sales or output that is judged con-
venient in any particular line of industry or trade, the problem
becomes one of encouraging business to hold more than its accus-
tomed ratio during depression and less than its accustomed ratio in
prosperity. This is, of course, the classical sphere and objective of
short-term credit policy. If the stabilization of business is an objec-
tive of monetary control, it should be the purpose of the banking
system to cheapen and loosen credit as business declines and so
encourage businessmen to hold larger stocks than they otherwise
would do. And contrariwise as business improves.
Such action, of course, must always be subject to the paramount
concern of banks with the solvency of their customers. And, on the
other side, the effectiveness of credit controls will be weakened to
the extent that customers do not rely on commercial credit and
treat small changes in the cost of credit as inconsequential.
REDUCING SENSITEVITY TO PRICE CHANCES
Credit policy is again one method of control: it can discourage loans
to customers for speculative use. This device issubject to the
difficulties noted above and to the additional obstacle of discovering
the purposes for which customers will use the funds placed at their
disposal.
A second method is through a possible reform of capital gains
taxation. As matters now stand, only the gains of persons actually
engaged in commodity trading are subject to capital gains taxes.
Gains resulting from changes in the value of commodities that con-
stitute the stock in trade of an ordinary business are amalgamated
with other business income and are subject only to ordinary cor-
porate or personal income taxes. Thus there is no possibility under
current procedures of special punitive taxation to discourage inven-
tory speculation so far as the bulk of inventories is concerned. If a
change in this practice could be made, it would be possible to
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remove a large part of the incentive for speculative accumulation
of stocks by suitably high capital gains taxes.
The difficulties in the way of such a reform are, however, very
great. To subject the whole of the inventories of a business to a
special and very heavy capital gains tax in the event of a price rise
would greatly discourage the holding of stocks for ordinary pur-
poses.Although the price would have raised the value of assets by
more, presumably, than the amount of the tax, few firms would be
in a position to liquidate their working inventory in order to meet
their tax bill. To apply the tax only to that portion of stocks held
for speculation would require that the tax authorities decide whether
at any time during a tax period inventories larger than justified by
the volume of business had been accumulated. And aside from the
problem of setting standards appropriate to the different and
changing conditions of each firm, it would always be possible for a
businessman to claim that he made larger than normal purchases of
supplies because he expected larger than normal increases in sales.
Such inventory control was attempted by the War Production Board
for a few scarce commodities, and it is now being attempted, again
on a limited scale, by the National Production Authority. The War
Production Board enjoyed only mediocre success, and the degree of
detailed surveillance required seems to make such controls inappro-
priate for general application under peacetime conditions.
Policies Affecting the Volume of Stocks
Sub ject to Fluctuation
Even if it were impossible to reduce the amplitude of inventory
investment fluctuations (in the sense of the percentage changes in
stocks), it might still be possible to reduce the impact of such fluctua-
tions on business in general. This can be done if the mass of stocks
subject to fluctuation can be reduced, or, in other words, if business-
men can be induced to hold a smaller volume of stocks in connection
with any given volume of business than they now do.
FACTORS CONThOLLING THE AVERAGE SIZE OF STOCKS
RELATIVE TO SALES OR OUTPUT
An exhaustive catalogue of controlling factors will not be attempted.
Indeed, too little is known about the subject, and the most important
recommendation to be made under this head is that we ought to
learn more about it. What follows should be read subject to this
blanket qualification.
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From the point of view of the present problem, perhaps the chief
thing to grasp is that the average relation between stocks and sales
or output is determined by the amount of raw materials that in a
particular industry or trade is judged adequate to assure continuity
in production, or the amount of finished goods judged to be enough
for prompt delivery and the provision of adequate selections for
customers. This implies that relatively large stocks will be needed:
If supplies come from distant or uncertain sources;
If capacity of suppliers is limited;
If demand is subject to wide fluctuations;
If firms must be prepared to produce or offer for sale a wide
variety of goods among which demand may shift;
If customers demand, and sellers must provide, supplies from
stock rather than from goods made to order; or
If a series of processes are controlled by independent producers
rather than carried on by a single firm as an integrated operation.
INFLUENCES MAKING FOR SMALLER STOCKS
Consideration of these factors makes it apparent that anything
tending to assure prompt delivery of goods will make it safer for
business to operate with smaller stocks. Thus improved transport
facilities and larger manufacturing capacity would help.
Similarly any forces encouraging standardization of products and
parts (however much this might be regretted on other grounds)
would also be helpful. This points to continued technical research
and cooperation of the sort proposed in President Hoover's report
on Waste in Industry and also to progress in inventory control. Much
indeed has already been accomplished through closer scheduling of
production and purchasing by manufacturers seeking to reduce
warehouse and material handling costs and avoid the expense of
tying up working capital in unbalanced inventory. It also implies
that technical information to help consumers grapple with spurious
and useless product differentiation would bring additional benefits
by reducing the inventory burdens of business.
Encouragement of selling to (and purchase on) order would
make for smaller stocks, though it is not clear how such encourage-
ment can be provided aside from use of the tax proposals to be
described below.
Finally, the spread of vertical integration through industry and
trade should, if my suspicions are correct, make possible a reduction
in the volume of stocks required to carry any specified volume of
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business. With regard to this, what is needed, first of all, is informa-
tion that will enable us to judge whether integration does, in fact,
make possible a substantial reduction in inventories. If so, obstacles
now standing in the way of integration, for example, aspects of the
antitrust laws or discriminatory taxation of chain stores, would
deserve reconsideration.
AN TAX
The devices outlined above are all probably limited in effectiveness
and slow in operation. More may be accomplished by using the
tax power. The rationale of such use is that the liberality with
which business uses inventories to assure continuity in production,
rapid delivery, adequate selection, etc. depends on the cost of
holding stocks. If it cost nothing to hold inventories, average ratios
of inventories to sales would be larger than they are. The costs, as
they now exist, comprise such items as the risks of depreciation or
price drop, warehousing, handling costs, interest, and insurance.
The aggregate cost of holding stocks could be substantially increased
by a tax levied, say, on the average value of inventories held by
firms during a tax period. Such substantial increase in the cost of
holding stocks would tend to reduce the volume of inventories held
against any specified volume of business in a variety of ways:
1. Every firm would try to operate with smaller stocks, accepting
as an alternative some additional costs due to occasional interruption
of production, longer delivery periods, or inability to provide sam-
ples or prompt delivery of every variety of their product.
2. Slowly moving items would tend to be abandoned. So would
goods supplied from distant or uncertain sources, since using or
selling such goods requires relatively large stocks.
3. Selling to order would be encouraged at the expense of making
for stock.
4. Firms engaged in types of business requiring small stocks
would enjoy a competitive advantage over rivals whose business
requires a large stock. The former type would tend to grow at the
expense of the latter.2
2Thiseffect is considered by some to be discriminatory. But if the character
of a firm's business requires it to hold relatively large stocks, the cost it imposes
upon the community in terms of economic instability will be large, other things
being equal. It is not discriminatory to bring this cost home to its source through
a tax the weight of which is proportionate to the cause of the trouble, namely,
the size of stocks. It would, however, be just to argue that it is discriminatory
to strike at those firms that contribute heavily to business instability through the
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If the relative fluctuations of stocks (compared with their average
level) remained unchanged, the effect of smaller average inventory
holdings would be to reduce the impact of inventory cycles on the
economy at large. For if the same relative change in inventories
affects a smaller volume of stocks, it means a smaller change in
total output and employment.
In the writer's judgment, this would be the general effect of a
uniform inventory tax. It has been suggested, however, that if the
cost of holding stocks were increased, the tendency to economize
inventory holdings would be more pronounced in depression, when
the need to save money is relatively great, than it would be in
prosperity, when business practice becomes more lax. If so, the rela-
tive fluctuations of stocks would increase, and that would offset, at
least to some degree, the benefits from reducing the average volume
of stocks.
It will be recognized that an inventory tax would carry with it
some undesirable side effects. One is that it would discourage invest-
ment during the transitional period in which business is adjusting
to a lower level of stocks. This, however, is strictly a transitional
effect, which would have no continuing consequences. If the tax
were imposed at a time of economic strain, rather than slack, even
the transitional effects might be beneficial, on the whole.
The other collateral effects of an inventory tax would be like those
of a sales tax. It would be regressive in its effects on income distri-
bution and undesirable on that account. But the inventory tax need
not provide a net increase in excise revenues. Since need for revenue
is unaffected, this tax can be imposed as a substitute for other forms
of excise taxation—a substitute with the peculiar and desirable char-
acteristic of encouraging economy in inventory holdings.
Contracyclical Public Stockpile
The objective of a public stockpile is easily stated: to provide a
large inventory of commodities in which the rate of accumulation
and liquidation would move in a direction opposite to that of invest-
ment in private business inventories. Public stockpiling now has
ample precedent in this country, partly in connection with agricul-
tural support programs, partly for security purposes.
The commodities to be included in the program would have
sizeoftheir stocks and not at others that may contribute just as heavily some
other way.
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to be restricted to staples, and the staples of interest are nonfarm
commodities. If all nonfarm staples were included, the commodities
involved would be those whose inventories now comprise perhaps
20 per cent of all nonfarm stocks. To stockpile so many goods, how-
ever, would require the administration of a vast number of com-
modities, taking account of the many kinds and grades of even
standard products. The number of commodities that could be
handled would, therefore, almost certainly turn out to be fewer.
This seriously limits the scope and, therefore, the usefulness of the
scheme. An investigation of the number and value of the commodi-
ties that could be included, as well as of the probable financial
demands of the scheme, would be desirable.
The operation of the scheme would, of course, require the most
serious consideration. The objective should be to devise a plan by
which the administration of the public stock might be reasonably
automatic and flexible. The operating scheme should not require
forecasting, and it should provide some protection against the
accumulation of unduly large stocks in time of depression.
One possible method would be to require all holders of com-
modities covered by the scheme to report their holdings monthly.
The public stock authority might then undertake to purchase (sell)
during any month an amount of each commodity equal to some
specified proportion, perhaps one half, of the quantity liquidated
(accumulated) by private holders during the previous month. Such
a plan would be automatic, and it would substantially offset the
fluctuations in private inventory investment for those commodities
included in the scheme. Moreover, it would not permit private
holders to unload unwanted output on the government. In time of
depression, for example, it would be impossible for an industry to
produce more than the market was absorbing by selling to the
public stock authority. That authority would purchase only if
production had been reduced below the level of current demand,
and even then only to the extent of one-half the rate at which
private stocks were falling. The operations of the public stockpile
would, therefore, act only to mitigate the depressing effect of
inventory liquidation or the expansive force of accumulation.
Since there is a very strong positive correlation between private
inventory investment and business activity in general, there is a
presumption that a public stockpile, so operated, would serve to
ameliorate the disturbing effects of inventory investment. It is true,
however, that investment in some commodity stocks is inversely
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correlated with business or positively correlated with a long lag.
Some of the staples, otherwise eligible for inclusion in the scheme,
are prominent members of this maverick group. Private investment
in such commodities now does something to stabilize business at
some cycle stages, and public stockpiling of these items would
interfere with such beneficial tendencies. It will be important,
therefore, to study the cyclical traits of particular commodity stocks
to be included in the scheme, as well as their volume and the ease
with which they can be handled.
COMMENT
LUDWIG S. HELLBORN, General Motors Corporation
Assuming that other problems raised by Mr. Abramovitz's pro-
posal to tax inventories could be solved, there would remain a dif-
ferential effect that he has not allowed for. As part of the Internal
Revenue Code, the taxes payable thereunder could be deducted by
the taxpayer in the determination of both ordinary net income and
adjusted excess profits net income in the same manner in which
existing taxes are now deductible. This being the case, a tax designed
to have a given economic effect at the rate of x per cent would,
under existing law, have 70 per cent of that effect in the case of a
corporation with net income of less than $25,000; it would have only
48 per cent of its intended effect in the case of a corporation with
larger net income not subject to the excess profits tax; and it would
have only 18 per cent of its intended effect in the case of a corpora-
lion subject to excess profits tax.
This dilution of economic effect could be avoided if this punitive
tax were levied under the Criminal Code, where it rightfully be-
longs. As such, its effect would be unmodified by the vagaries of
income and excess profits taxes since criminal penalties are not
deductible from gross income. Taxes of the kind here proposed have
the effect of perverting the Internal Revenue Code into a kind of
junior Criminal Code and they should be recognized for what they
are.
OswAw KNAUTH
As we should expect, Dr. Abramovitz has added new knowledge by
his keen analysis of movements of inventories. Particularly interest-
ing is his division of the movements of inventories into the cases of
the "transaction motive" and the "speculative motive." I think he
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could have gone one point further and separated the speculative
motive from the desire to guard against shortage of goods. I do not
think the latter is speculative. Rather it is a business judgment of
how far ahead it is necessary or wise to make commitments. This
judgment, of course, varies at different times according to circum-
stances. But basically commitments are made in order to keep the
machine running without interruption. In mass production or mass
distribution, continuity is the prime consideration.
I also believe that a great many inventory movements in the going
concern have no motive behind them. They just happen when the
flow of distribution and the flow of manufacture get out of step with
each other. A small variation piles up before it is noticeable. Even
after it is noticed and corrective steps are taken, it takes time before
the rate of flow can be enlarged or reduced enough to effect a cure.
Such changes in the rate of flow are part of a dynamic economy.
They are often due to extraneous causes having little apparent con-
nection with the industry involved and imputable neither to the
transaction nor to the speculative motive.
I confess I cannot follow Dr. Abramovitz on his buffer stock
scheme for stabilizing industry. But then I suspect that Dr. Abramo-
vitz himself is not too enthusiastic about this type of remedy. I
have yet to see a government body that could handle inventory
problems with the degree of wisdom that such a scheme would
require. Possibly, it could succeed for basic, imperishable materials.
But I doubt success in any finished product.
In this area, industry is far less helpless than it was, say, twenty
or twenty-five years ago. During the intervening period an organiza-
tion of creative marketing has developed that did not previously
exist. The American Marketing Association is symbolic. Starting
from scratch about fifteen years ago, it has today over 4,000 mem-
bers, with active groups in many localities. There are many market
research organizations that have displaced mere selling pressure
with intelligence. They are showing that demand can be created,
and that this is not merely a matter of price. Indeed, price enters
into marketing only as one of a number of factors, such as new
utility, a hitherto untapped economy of operation, a more correct
size of package, a more functional and useful design, new distribu-
tive outlets and services. This new concept of marketing has barely
begun to scratch the surface of its possibilities. But the organization
exists and any organization can be expanded more easily than it
can be created.
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In a recent speech, Paul W. Stewart, of Stewart Dugall Associates,
and one of the pioneers of the new methods, concluded:
"In summary, dynamic marketing researchisevolving from
'static' marketing research because of the increasing recognition of
the gap between fact-finding and the interpretation and application
of those facts from a management viewpoint. It means a closer
liaison between research people and operating people. It helps to
bridge the gap between the problems confronting each group.
"There is evidence today that shows increasing acceptance of the
dynamic concept. Management shows its reaction by increasingly
stressing the use of research personnel who demonstrate a sound
understanding of their problems. Among research organizations there
are an increasing number of firms that offer staffs balanced in aca-
demic training and practical marketing experience. This background
must be coupled with an appreciation of the management approach,
to provide the foundation for true dynamic research."
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